In R. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 29-54 (2015)

Authors
Alexandre Billon
Université Charles-de-Gaulle - Lille 3
Abstract
According to what we will call subjectivity theories of consciousness, there is a constitutive connection between phenomenal consciousness and subjectivity: there is something it is like for a subject to have mental state M only if M is characterized by a certain mine-ness or for-me-ness. Such theories appear to face certain psychopathological counterexamples: patients appear to report conscious experiences that lack this subjective element. A subsidiary goal of this chapter is to articulate with greater precision both subjectivity theories and the psychopathological challenge they face. The chapter’s central goal is to present two new approaches to defending subjectivity theories in the face of this challenge. What distinguishes these two approaches is that they go to great lengths to interpret patients’ reports at face value – greater length, at any rate, than more widespread approaches in the extant literature.
Keywords consciousness  schizophrenia  somatoparaphrenia  thought insertion  depersonalization  subjectivity  self-representationalism  acquaintance
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References found in this work BETA

Consciousness and Mind.David Rosenthal - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
A Theory of Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1997 - In Ned Block, Owen J. Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. MIT Press.

View all 22 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

For-Me-Ness: What It is and What It is Not.Dan Zahavi & Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - In D. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou & W. Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology. Routledge. pp. 36-53.
The Self Shows Up in Experience.Matt Duncan - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):299-318.
Basic Self‐Awareness.Alexandre Billon - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):732-763.
Basic Self‐Awareness.Alexandre Billon - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

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