L'inertie du mental

Dialogue 32 (03):507-525 (1993)
Abstract
This paper addresses two objections raised against anomalous monism. Firstly, on the basis of Davidson's assertion that all causal relations fall under strict laws, many critics conclude mental properties are causally inert since they are non-nomic. I argue that this conclusion follows only on the further assumption that all causally efficacious properties are nomic properties. It is perfectly consistent, however, to hold that there is a law covering each causal relation without each causal statement being the instantiation of a law. Secondly, I countervail Kim's claim that the only option open to the physicalists is reductionism by showing how weak supervenience preserves both the dependence of the mental on the physical and the irreducibility of mental explanations to physical ones.
Keywords Anomalous Monism  Epiphenomenalism  Supervenience  Davidson
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DOI 10.1017/S0012217300012294
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References found in this work BETA
Essays on Actions and Events.Donald Davidson - 1980 - Oxford University Press.
Knowing One's Own Mind.Donald Davidson - 1987 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685-700.
Concepts of Supervenience.Jaegwon Kim - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (December):153-76.
Causal Relations.Donald Davidson - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (21):691-703.

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