In Adrian J. T. Alsmith & Frédérique de Vignemont (eds.), The Subject's Matter: Self-Consciousness and the Body. Boston, USA: MIT Press. pp. 189-216 (2017)

Authors
Alexandre Billon
Université Charles-de-Gaulle - Lille 3
Abstract
Depersonalization is a pathological condition consisting in a deep modification of the way things appear to a subject, leading him to feel estranged from his body, his actions, his thoughts, his mind and even from himself. In this article, I argue that the study of depersonalization raises three challenges for recent theories of the sense of bodily ownership. These challenges—which I call the centrality challenge, the dissociation challenge and the grounding challenge— thwart most of these theories and suggest that the sense of bodily ownership hinges on a phenomenal mark of mineness that can not be accounted for in terms of our sensory, interoceptive, agentive, cognitive or affective dispositions and that is psychologically primitive. In short: that mineness is first.
Keywords mineness  somatoparaphrenia  ownership  body  depersonalisation  self
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Basic Self‐Awareness.Alexandre Billon - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):732-763.
Bodily Ownership, Psychological Ownership, and Psychopathology.José Bermúdez - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):263-280.
Basic Self‐Awareness.Alexandre Billon - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).
What Phenomenal Contrast for Bodily Ownership?Frédérique de Vignemont - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (1):117-137.

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