Synthese 196 (12):5205-5229 (2019)

Authors
Alexandre Billon
Université Charles-de-Gaulle - Lille 3
Abstract
Most paradoxes of self-reference have a dual or ‘hypodox’. The Liar paradox (Lr = ‘Lr is false’) has the Truth-Teller (Tt = ‘Tt is true’). Russell’s paradox, which involves the set of sets that are not self-membered, has a dual involving the set of sets which are self-membered, etc. It is widely believed that these duals are not paradoxical or at least not as paradoxical as the paradoxes of which they are duals. In this paper, I argue that some paradox’s duals or hypodoxes are as paradoxical as the paradoxes of which they are duals, and that they raise neglected and interestingly different problems. I first focus on Richard’s paradox (arguably the simplest case of a paradoxical dual), showing both that its dual is as paradoxical as Richard’s paradox itself, and that the classical, Richard-Poincaré solution to the latter does not generalize to the former in any obvious way. I then argue that my argument applies mutatis mutandis to other paradoxes of self-reference as well, the dual of the Liar (the Truth-Teller) proving paradoxical.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-018-1711-1
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics.Alfred Tarski - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3):341-376.
Paradoxes and Failures of Cut.David Ripley - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):139 - 164.
Replacing Truth.Kevin Scharp - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):606 – 621.
Truth.J. L. Austin, P. F. Strawson & D. R. Cousin - 1950 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 24 (1):111-172.

View all 40 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Paradoxes and Hypodoxes of Time Travel.Peter Eldridge-Smith - 2007 - In Jan Lloyd Jones, Paul Campbell & Peter Wylie (eds.), Art and Time. Australian Scholarly Publishing. pp. 172--189.
Self-Deception.Stanley Paluch - 1967 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 10 (1-4):268-278.
Paradox and Psychotherapy.Gary Wayne Maryman - 1990 - Dissertation, Spalding University
Self-Deception.Alfred R. Mele - 1983 - Philosophical Quarterly 33 (October):366-377.
Anchor, Contrast, and Paradoxical Distance Effects.Harry Helson & Myrtle C. Nash - 1960 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 59 (2):113.
Rigid Designators: Two Applications.Michael Levin - 1987 - Philosophy of Science 54 (2):283-294.
Paradoxical Language in Chan Buddhism.Chien-Hsing Ho - 2020 - In Yiu-Ming Fung (ed.), Dao Companion to Chinese Philosophy of Logic. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 389-404.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-02-19

Total views
99 ( #99,279 of 2,403,165 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
30 ( #27,152 of 2,403,165 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes