Physics, machines, and the hard problem

Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):386-401 (1996)
The ‘hard problem’ of the origin of phenomenal consciousness in a physical universe is aggravated by a simplistic and uncritical concept of the physical realm which still predominates in much discussion of the subject. David Chalmers is correct in claiming that phenomenal experience is logically independent of a physical description of the world, but his proposal for a ‘natural supervenience’ of experience on a physical substrate is misguided. His statements about machine consciousness and the role of information are especially compromised. A careful analysis of physical concepts indicates that the hard problem as originally proposed is insoluble but also fortunately based on misconceptions. Modern physics suggests a more sophisticated and richer ontology which will be essential for a deeper understanding of our rapidly growing knowledge of psychology and neuroscience
Keywords Consciousness  Machine  Mind  Physics  Psychology  Science
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Howard Barnum (2003). Quantum Information Processing, Operational Quantum Logic, Convexity, and the Foundations of Physics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 34 (3):343-379.

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