Topoi 27 (1-2):17-27 (2008)

Abstract
Do conventions need to be common knowledge in order to work? David Lewis builds this requirement into his definition of a convention. This paper explores the extent to which his approach finds support in the game theory literature. The knowledge formalism developed by Robert Aumann and others militates against Lewis’s approach, because it shows that it is almost impossible for something to become common knowledge in a large society. On the other hand, Ariel Rubinstein’s Email Game suggests that coordinated action is no less hard for rational players without a common knowledge requirement. But an unnecessary simplifying assumption in the Email Game turns out to be doing all the work, and the current paper concludes that common knowledge is better excluded from a definition of the conventions that we use to regulate our daily lives
Keywords Conventions  Common knowledge  Game theory
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DOI 10.1007/s11245-008-9033-4
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References found in this work BETA

Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
The Strategy of Conflict.Thomas Schelling - 1960 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Imitation and Conventional Communication.Richard Moore - 2013 - Biology and Philosophy 28 (3):481-500.
Common Knowledge.Peter Vanderschraaf - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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Coordination in an Email Game Without ``Almost Common Knowledge''.Nicola Dimitri - 2003 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 12 (1):1-11.

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