Modeling Rational Players: Part II: Ken Binmore
Economics and Philosophy 4 (1):9-55 (1988)
| Abstract |
This is the second part of a two-part paper. It can be read independently of the first part provided that the reader is prepared to go along with the unorthodox views on game theory which were advanced in Part I and are summarized below. The body of the paper is an attempt to study some of the positive implications of such a viewpoint. This requires an exploration of what is involved in modeling “rational players” as computing machines.
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| DOI | 10.1017/S0266267100000328 |
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References found in this work BETA
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.John von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern - 1945 - Journal of Philosophy 42 (20):550-554.
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Citations of this work BETA
Agent‐Based Computational Models and Generative Social Science.Joshua M. Epstein - 1999 - Complexity 4 (5):41-60.
Common Reasoning in Games: A Lewisian Analysis of Common Knowledge of Rationality.Robin P. Cubitt & Robert Sugden - 2014 - Economics and Philosophy 30 (3):285-329.
The Surprise Exam Paradox, Rationality, and Pragmatics: A Simple Game‐Theoretic Analysis.José Luis Ferreira & Jesús Zamora Bonilla - 2008 - Journal of Economic Methodology 15 (3):285-299.
The Logic of Rational Play in Games of Perfect Information.Giacomo Bonanno - 1991 - Economics and Philosophy 7 (1):37-65.
The Epistemic Structure of a Theory of a Game.Michael Bacharach - 1994 - Theory and Decision 37 (1):7-48.
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