Justified judging

Authors
Alexander James Bird
King's College London
Abstract
When is a belief or judgment justified? One might be forgiven for thinking the search for single answer to this question to be hopeless. The concept of justification is required to fulfil several tasks: to evaluate beliefs epistemically, to fill in the gap between truth and knowledge, to describe the virtuous organization of one’s beliefs, to describe the relationship between evidence and theory (and thus relate to confirmation and probabilification). While some of these may be held to overlap, the prospects for fulfilling all may well seem poor. Furthermore the internalist requires that justification be an introspectible property of beliefs and a fundamental epistemic concept, while the externalist is often happy to ignore the concept altogether or at best regard it as an embarrassing add-on to their epistemology. In the light of this one might reasonably give up on justification altogether or adopt pluralist approach, denying that justification is any single property of beliefs of judgments.
Keywords justification, belief, judgment
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00004.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 35,010
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Papers.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.

View all 23 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Believing Epistemic Contradictions.Beddor Bob & Simon Goldstein - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic (1):87-114.
The Externalist’s Demon.Clayton Littlejohn - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):399-434.
The Illusion of Exclusivity.Conor McHugh - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1117-1136.

View all 36 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Foundationalism and Arbitrariness.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):18–24.
Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Scientific Realism, Perceptual Beliefs, and Justification.Richard Otte - 1990 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:393 - 404.
Epistemic Justification.Richard Swinburne - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
Is Justification Knowledge?B. J. C. Madison - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Research 35:173-191.
Ultra-Strong Internalism and the Reliabilist Insight.Dan D. Crawford - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 27:311-328.
Stick to What You Know.Jonathan Sutton - 2005 - Noûs 39 (3):359–396.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
177 ( #32,191 of 2,275,228 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #40,376 of 2,275,228 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature