Analysis 63 (3):221–228 (2003)

Alexander James Bird
Cambridge University
In his (2002) Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra provides a powerful articulation of the claim that Resemblance Nominalism provides the best answer to the so-called Problem of Universals. Resemblance Nominalism has not been popular for some time, and one influential reason for this is the widespread belief that Resemblance Nominalism cannot dispense with all universals. The realist critics appeal to what is known as Russell’s Regress (cf. Russell 1997). If properties are to be explained in terms of one object’s resembling another, then this seems to leave the relational property of resemblance itself unexplained. The critics’ objection is that this property itself must be explained by a dyadic universal of resemblance.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1467-8284.00426
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 62,289
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic.David K. Lewis - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (5):113-126.
On the Plurality of Worlds.Allen Stairs - 1988 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (2):333-352.

View all 10 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

What's Wrong with Ostrich Nominalism?Howard Peacock - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (2):183-217.
II—Resemblance Nominalism, Conjunctions and Truthmakers.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (1pt1):21-38.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
334 ( #26,372 of 2,444,969 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #232,632 of 2,444,969 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes