Authors
Noell Birondo
Wichita State University
Abstract
Philosophical lessons come in many different shapes and sizes. Some lessons are big, some are small. Some lessons go deep and have a big impact, some are shallow and have almost none. Some lessons are not really philosophical at all or would not really be lessons for an audience of academic philosophers. I mention these truisms not to disparage this informative book on 'moral OCD' (moral obsessive-compulsive disorder, or 'Scrupulosity') but rather to emphasize how difficult it can be to discern the book's intended audience, given its interdisciplinary aims and structure. That question is never explicitly addressed (it is admittedly a slim book, slimmer than it appears), but the question has consequences for how to think about the book's ultimate value, and for whom. The book might attract two groups in particular: philosophers working on the nature of responsibility (the subject of the book's longest chapter) and psychiatric researchers or mental health professionals interested in moral philosophy and the philosophy of mental illness. I will return to what moral philosophers can learn from moral OCD, but there will be spoilers.
Keywords Responsibility  Jesse S. Summers  Walter Sinnott-Armstrong  Psychopathology  Moral Saints
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Scrupulous Agents.Jesse S. Summers & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):947-966.
Review - The New Intuitionism. [REVIEW]Dan Baras - 2012 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 16 (49).
Problems for Sinnott-Armstrong's Moral Contrastivism.Peter Baumann - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):463–470.
Non-Inferential Moral Knowledge.Elizabeth Tropman - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (4):355-366.
Moderate Classy Pyrrhonian Moral Scepticism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):448–456.
Morality, Normativity, and Society.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):552.
Summary of Moral Sketicisms.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Philosophical Books 49 (3):193-196.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-03-09

Total views
26 ( #374,001 of 2,326,043 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
26 ( #25,265 of 2,326,043 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes