The regress of pure powers?

Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):513–534 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Dispositional monism is the view that natural properties and relations are ‘pure powers’. It is objected that dispositional monism involves some kind of vicious or otherwise unpalatable regress or circularity. I examine ways of making this objection precise. The most pressing interpretation is that is fails to make the identities of powers determinate. I demonstrate that this objection is in error. It does however puts certain constraints on what the structure of fundamental properties is like. I show what a satisfactory structure would be.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,168

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Ontology of Pure Dispositions.William A. Bauer - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Regarding a Regress.Yuri Cath - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):358-388.
Structural properties.Alexander Bird - 2003 - In Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra & Hallvard Lillehammer (eds.), Real Metaphysics. Routledge. pp. 155-68.
What Do Powers Do When They Are Not Manifested?Stathis Psillos - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):137-156.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
346 (#59,053)

6 months
37 (#99,860)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Alexander James Bird
Cambridge University

References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Scientific Essentialism.Brian Ellis - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
From an ontological point of view.John Heil - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Truth and truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

View all 40 references / Add more references