In praise of epistemic irresponsibility: How lazy and ignorant can you be?

Synthese 122 (1-2):179 - 208 (2000)
Abstract
Epistemic responsibility involves at least two central ideas. (V) To be epistemically responsible is to display the virtue(s) epistemic internalists take to be central to justification (e.g., coherence, having good reasons, fitting the evidence). (C) In normal (non-skeptical)circumstances and in thelong run, epistemic responsibility is strongly positively correlated with reliability. Sections 1 and 2 review evidence showing that for a wide range of real-world problems, the most reliable, tractable reasoning strategies audaciously flout the internalist''s epistemic virtues. In Section 3, I argue that these results force us to give up either (V), our current conception of what it is to be epistemically responsible, or (C) the responsibility-reliability connection. I will argue that we should relinquish (V). This is likely to reshape our epistemic practices. It will force us to alter our epistemic judgments about certain instances of reasoning, to endorse some counterintuitive epistemic prescriptions, and to rethink what it is for cognitive agents to be epistemically responsible.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1005228312224
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,133
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Epistemic Trust, Epistemic Responsibility, and Medical Practice.A. P. Schwab - 2008 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 33 (4):302-320.
Fast and Frugal Heuristics.Michael A. Bishop - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (2):201–223.
Bounded Rationality.Till Grüne-Yanoff - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (3):534–563.
Gert on Subjective Practical Rationality.Christian Miller - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):551-561.
The Theory Theory Thrice Over: The Child as Scientist, Superscientist, or Social Institution?Michael A. Bishop - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (1):121-36.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
128 ( #38,834 of 2,191,826 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #18,838 of 2,191,826 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature