Hypatia 28 (4):937-954 (2013)

Mavis Biss
Loyola University Maryland
This paper develops the basis for a new account of radical moral imagination, understood as the transformation of moral understandings through creative response to the sensed inadequacy of one's moral concepts or morally significant appraisals of lived experience. Against Miranda Fricker, I argue that this kind of transition from moral perplexity to increased moral insight is not primarily a matter of the “top-down” use of concepts. Against Susan Babbitt, I argue that it is not primarily a matter of “bottom-up” intuitive responsiveness to experience. Beyond courage and hope, radical moral imagination involves the articulation of inchoate experience, which allows individuals to make new kinds of moral moves and to lay claim to others' acknowledgment of the meaning of these moves
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DOI 10.1111/hypa.12018
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Arguments.Charles Taylor - 1995 - Harvard University Press.
The Principles of Art.R. G. Collingwood - 1938 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Must We Mean What We Say?Stanley Cavell - 1958 - In V. C. Chappell (ed.), Inquiry. New York: Dover Publications. pp. 172 – 212.

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Citations of this work BETA

Epistemic Injustice.Rachel McKinnon - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (8):437-446.
Moral Imagination, Perception, and Judgment.Mavis Biss - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):1-21.
Radical Moral Imagination and Moral Luck.Mavis Biss - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (4-5):558-570.
Scattered In Times.Sarah Stewart-Kroeker - 2020 - Journal of Religious Ethics 48 (1):45-73.

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