Synthese 185 (2):233-255 (2012)

Authors
Michel Bitbol
University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
Abstract
Emergence is interpreted in a non-dualist framework of thought. No metaphysical distinction between the higher and basic levels of organization is supposed, but only a duality of modes of access. Moreover, these modes of access are not construed as mere ways of revealing intrinsic patterns of organization: They are supposed to be constitutive of them, in Kant’s sense. The emergent levels of organization, and the inter-level causations as well, are therefore neither illusory nor ontologically real: They are objective in the sense of transcendental epistemology. This neo-Kantian approach defuses several paradoxes associated with the concept of downward causation, and enables one to make good sense of it independently of any prejudice about the existence (or inexistence) of a hierarchy of levels of being
Keywords Emergence  Inter-level relations  Anti-foundationalism  Transcendentalism  Objectivity  Anti-realism  Quantum mechanics
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Reprint years 2012
DOI 10.1007/s11229-010-9723-5
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Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals.Immanuel Kant - 1785/2002 - Oxford University Press.
Critique of Pure Reason.I. Kant - 1787/1998 - Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.

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