Stronger Reasons

In Lukas H. Meyer, Stanley L. Paulson & Thomas W. Pogge (eds.), Rights, Culture and the Law: Themes From the Legal and Political Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Oxford University Press (2003)
We compare the reasons one has in terms of strength, and the task of the present chapter is to explain what it is for one reason to be stronger than another. Raz offered a criterion, but that is shown to yield unsatisfactory results. The explanation proposed here is this: stronger reasons are states of affairs or events more important to the agent, the notion of importance deriving from Frankfurt's explication of what we care about. This proposal does not reduce the strength of reasons to the strength of the relevant desires. Contrary to Frankfurt's view, however, it does away with the difference between the order of reasons and the order of caring.
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DOI 10.1093/0195143647.003.0010
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