Can Theories of Meaning and Reference Solve the Problem of Legal Determinacy?

Ratio Juris 16 (3):281-295 (2003)

Authors
Brian Bix
University of Minnesota
Abstract
A number of important legal theorists have recently argued for metaphysically realist approaches to legal determinacy grounded in particular semantic theories or theories of reference, in particular, views of meaning and reference based on the works of Putnam and Kripke. The basic position of these theorists is that questions of legal interpretation and legal determinacy should be approached through semantic meaning. However, the role of authority (in the form of lawmaker choice) in law in general, and democratic systems in particular, require that these realist solutions to the problem of legal determinacy be rejected, or at least significantly revised.
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9337.00237
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Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Leviathan.Thomas Hobbes - 2006 - In Aloysius Martinich, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Early Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings with Commentary. Blackwell.

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