Oxford University Press (1993)
This book discusses one of the central problems in the philosophy of law--the question of legal determinacy. Is the law a seamless web or are there gaps? Bix argues that the major re-thinking of the common and "common sense" views about law that have been proposed by various recent legal theories is unnecessary. He offers a reconsideration of the role of language in the law, and the way ideas about language have been used and misused in recent legal theory. He explores in depth the relationship to legal theory of Hart's influential idea of "open texture," Dworkin's interpretative approach to law, and Wittgenstein's philosophy.
|Keywords||Law Philosophy Semantics (Law Law Language|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$52.99 used (47% off) $56.15 new (44% off) $67.99 direct from Amazon (32% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||K230.B57.L39 1993|
|ISBN(s)||0198257902 0198260504 9780198260509|
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Citations of this work BETA
On Legal Inferentialism. Toward a Pragmatics of Semantic Content in Legal Interpretation?Damiano Canale & Giovanni Tuzet - 2007 - Ratio Juris 20 (1):32-44.
Can Theories of Meaning and Reference Solve the Problem of Legal Determinacy?Brian Bix - 2003 - Ratio Juris 16 (3):281-295.
Linguistic Competence and Expertise.Mark Addis - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (2):327-336.
Responses to Discussants.Diana Raffman - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):483-501.
Taking Rights Less Seriously. A Structural Analysis of Judicial Discretion.Matthias Klatt - 2007 - Ratio Juris 20 (4):506-529.
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