Impossible worlds and logical omniscience: an impossibility result

Synthese 190 (13):2505-2524 (2013)
In this paper, I investigate whether we can use a world-involving framework to model the epistemic states of non-ideal agents. The standard possible-world framework falters in this respect because of a commitment to logical omniscience. A familiar attempt to overcome this problem centers around the use of impossible worlds where the truths of logic can be false. As we shall see, if we admit impossible worlds where “anything goes” in modal space, it is easy to model extremely non-ideal agents that are incapable of performing even the most elementary logical deductions. A much harder, and considerably less investigated challenge is to ensure that the resulting modal space can also be used to model moderately ideal agents that are not logically omniscient but nevertheless logically competent. Intuitively, while such agents may fail to rule out subtly impossible worlds that verify complex logical falsehoods, they are nevertheless able to rule out blatantly impossible worlds that verify obvious logical falsehoods. To model moderately ideal agents, I argue, the job is to construct a modal space that contains only possible and non-trivially impossible worlds where it is not the case that “anything goes”. But I prove that it is impossible to develop an impossible-world framework that can do this job and that satisfies certain standard conditions. Effectively, I show that attempts to model moderately ideal agents in a world-involving framework collapse to modeling either logical omniscient agents, or extremely non-ideal agents
Keywords Impossible worlds  Logical omniscience  Rationality  Resource-bounded reasoning  Logical reasoning
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-011-0038-y
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
References found in this work BETA
The Logic of Decision.Richard Jeffrey - 1965 - University of Chicago Press.
Truth and the Absence of Fact.Hartry Field - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
Impossible Worlds: A Modest Approach.Daniel Nolan - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):535-572.

View all 19 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
The Problem of Rational Knowledge.Mark Jago - 2013 - Erkenntnis (S6):1-18.
Problems in Epistemic Space.Jens Christian Bjerring - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic (1):1-18.
Problems in Epistemic Space.Jens Christian Bjerring - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (1):153-170.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Non-Ideal Epistemic Spaces.Jens Christian Bjerring - 2010 - Dissertation, Australian National University
Systems of Modal Logic for Impossible Worlds.Charles G. Morgan - 1973 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 16 (1-4):280 – 289.
Problems in Epistemic Space.Jens Christian Bjerring - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic (1):1-18.
Mundos Imposibles.Pescador José Hierro - 1985 - Theoria 1 (1):143-157.
A Classically-Based Theory of Impossible Worlds.Edward N. Zalta - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):640-660.
Counterpossibles.Barak Krakauer - 2012 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts
Impossible Worlds.Francesco Berto - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2013).
Real Impossible Worlds : The Bounds of Possibility.Ira Georgia Kiourti - 2010 - Dissertation, University of St Andrews
Epistemic Logic for Rule-Based Agents.Mark Jago - 2009 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 18 (1):131-158.
Constructing Worlds.Mark Jago - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):59-74.
Hintikka and Cresswell on Logical Omniscience.Mark Jago - 2006 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 15 (3):325-354.
Added to PP index

Total downloads
540 ( #3,714 of 2,214,215 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
46 ( #6,058 of 2,214,215 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature