Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (1):101–112 (2016)

Gunnar Björnsson
Stockholm University
Ragnar Francén
University of Gothenburg (PhD)
Taking Morality Seriously is David Enoch’s book-length defense of meta-ethical and meta-normative non-naturalist realism. After describing Enoch’s position and outlining the argumentative strategy of the book, we engage in a critical discussion of what we take to be particularly problematic central passages. We focus on Enoch’s two original positive arguments for non-naturalist realism, one argument building on first order moral implications of different meta-ethical positions, the other attending to the rational commitment to normative facts inherent in practical deliberation. We also pay special attention to Enoch’s handling of two types of objections to non-naturalist realism, objections having to do with the possibility of moral knowledge and with moral disagreement.
Keywords David Enoch  Moral Realism
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Reprint years 2016
DOI 10.1163/17455243-01301001
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