Authors
Gunnar Björnsson
Stockholm University
Abstract
In this book, Rik Peels provides a comprehensive original account of intellectual duties, doxastic blameworthiness, and responsible belief. The discussions, relating to work in epistemology as well as moral responsibility, are clear and often provide useful entries into the literature. Though I disagree with some of the main conclusions, the arguments are carefully laid out and typically merit a good amount of thought even where one remains unconvinced. After providing an overview of the contents, I specifically suggest that Peels theory fails to account for one important kind of doxastic obligations and doxastic blame.
Keywords Epistemic responsibility  Moral responsibility  Doxastic blame
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Why Responsible Belief is Blameless Belief.Anthony Booth & Rik Peels - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (5):257-265.
Against Doxastic Compatibilism.Rik Peels - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):679-702.
Doxastic Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2007 - Synthese 155 (1):127-155.
In Defense of Doxastic Blame.Lindsay Rettler - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2205-2226.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-10-18

Total views
115 ( #88,089 of 2,425,361 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
13 ( #53,997 of 2,425,361 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes