Noûs 46 (2):326-354 (2012)

Authors
Gunnar Björnsson
Stockholm University
Abstract
In this paper, we do three things. First, we put forth a novel hypothesis about judgments of moral responsibility according to which such judgments are a species of explanatory judgments. Second, we argue that this hypothesis explains both some general features of everyday thinking about responsibility and the appeal of skeptical arguments against moral responsibility. Finally, we argue that, if correct, the hypothesis provides a defense against these skeptical arguments.
Keywords Moral responsibility  Moral psychology  Ethics  Free will  Determinism  Luck
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Reprint years 2009, 2012
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00813.x
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Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.

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Citations of this work BETA

Explaining (Away) the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility.Gunnar Björnsson - 2017 - In Philip Robichaud & Jan Willem Wieland (eds.), Responsibility - The Epistemic Condition. Oxford University Press. pp. 146–162.
Moral Luck.Dana K. Nelkin - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Explaining Away Epistemic Skepticism About Culpability.Gunnar Björnsson - 2017 - In Shoemaker David (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 141–164.
Essentially Shared Obligations.Gunnar Björnsson - 2014 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 38 (1):103-120.
Compatibilism.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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