Ampliative abduction

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (2):141 – 157 (1996)
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Abstract

Abstract In Peirce's and Hanson's characterization of abductive inference, the abducted hypothesis (but not others) is present in the premises, so that the inference can hardly be taken as ampliative. Abduction has consequently been treated as part of the process whereby already generated hypotheses are judged in terms of their plausibility, simplicity, etc. I propose an interpretation of abduction which supports an ampliative view. It relies on a distinction between two logical stages in the generation of hypotheses, one ?factual? and one ?explanatory?. I also indicate how we may reconstruct Peirce's and Hanson's original inference in an ampliative form

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Citations of this work

How science textbooks treat scientific method: A philosopher's perspective.James Blachowicz - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2):303--344.

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References found in this work

The logic of scientific discovery.Karl Raimund Popper - 1934 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Hutchinson Publishing Group.
A treatise of human nature.David Hume & D. G. C. Macnabb (eds.) - 1977 - New York: Dutton.
Patterns of discovery.Norwood Russell Hanson - 1958 - Cambridge [Eng.]: University Press.
Critique of Pure Reason.I. Kant - 1787/1998 - Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.
Collected papers.Charles S. Peirce - 1931 - Cambridge,: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

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