Acta Analytica 23 (3):187-205 (2008)
According to a Moorean response to skepticism, the standards for knowledge are invariantly comparatively low, and we can know across contexts all that we ordinarily take ourselves to know. It is incumbent upon the Moorean to defend his position by explaining how, in contexts in which S seems to lack knowledge, S can nevertheless have knowledge. The explanation proposed here relies on a warranted-assertability maneuver: Because we are warranted in asserting that S doesn’t know that p, it can seem that S does in fact lack that piece of knowledge. Moreover, this warranted-assertability maneuver is unique and better than similar maneuvers because it makes use of H. P. Grice’s general conversational rule of Quantity—“Do not make your contribution more informative than is required”—in explaining why we are warranted in asserting that S doesn’t know that p.
|Keywords||Warranted-assertability Mooreanism Skepticism Knowledge|
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References found in this work BETA
Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature.Stephen C. Levinson - 2000 - MIT Press.
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Knowledge, Conservatism, and Pragmatics.Paul Dimmock & Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3239-3269.
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