Res Publica 6 (2):179-198 (2000)

Political judgment is notoriously hard to theorise, and in the recent debates surrounding Habermas's discourse ethics we encounter classic disagreements around the nature, operation and validity of such judgments. This paper evaluates Habermas's account of political judgment and explores the problems raised by his critics. It then focuses on the contentious role played by universals within his account. What emerges is a reformulated theory of judgment based on the thin universalism of fair deliberation, and a description of a sub-set of judgments, termed ``democratic judgments'', which are oriented to the preservation of democracy.
Keywords deliberation  democracy  discourse ethics  Habermas  justification  Kant  Neo-Aristotelianism  political judgment  reflective judgment  Wittgenstein
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1009613924261
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