Synthese 154 (1):53-71 (2007)

Authors
Tim Black
California State University, Northridge
Peter Murphy
University of Indianapolis
Abstract
The sensitivity condition on knowledge says that one knows that P only if one would not believe that P if P were false. Difficulties for this condition are now well documented. Keith DeRose has recently suggested a revised sensitivity condition that is designed to avoid some of these difficulties. We argue, however, that there are decisive objections to DeRose’s revised condition. Yet rather than simply abandoning his proposed condition, we uncover a rationale for its adoption, a rationale which suggests a further revision that avoids our objections as well as others. The payoff is considerable: along the way to our revision, we learn lessons about the epistemic significance of certain explanatory relations, about how we ought to envisage epistemic closure principles, and about the epistemic significance of methods of belief formation.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-005-8487-9
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and Belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
Solving the Skeptical Problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Epistemic Risk.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (11):550-571.
Fake Barns and False Dilemmas.Clayton Littlejohn - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):369-389.
The Modal Account of Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):594-619.
Anti-Luck Epistemology and the Gettier Problem.Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):93-111.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Presupposition and Context Sensitivity.Ernie Lepore & Adam Sennet - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (5):613-627.
Sensitivity, Safety, and Closure.Sven Bernecker - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (4):367-381.
The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology.Kelly Becker & Tim Black (eds.) - 2012 - Cambridge University Press.
The Contrast-Sensitivity of Knowledge Ascriptions.Jonathan Schaffer - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):235-245.
Is There a Right of National Defense?Thomas Peard - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:341-347.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
211 ( #45,036 of 2,425,462 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
15 ( #48,398 of 2,425,462 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes