Dissertation, Stanford University (1990)
AbstractThis thesis is an examination of Frege's logicism, and of a number of objections which are widely viewed as refutations of the logicist thesis. In the view offered here, logicism is designed to provide answers to two questions: that of the nature of arithmetical truth, and that of the source of arithmetical knowledge. ;The first objection dealt with here is the view that logicism is not an epistemologically significant thesis, due to the fact that the epistemological status of logic itself is not well understood. I argue to the contrary that on Frege's conception of logic, logicism is of clear epistemological importance. ;The second objection examined is the claim that Godel's first incompleteness theorem falsifies logicism. I argue that the incompleteness theorem has no impact on logicism unless the logicist is compelled to hold that logic is recursively enumerable. I argue, further, that there is no reason to impose this requirement on logicism. ;The third objection concerns Russell's paradox. I argue that the paradox is devastating to Frege's conception of numbers, but not to his logicist project. I suggest that the appropriate course for a post-Fregean logicist to follow is one which divorces itself from Frege's platonism. ;The conclusion of this thesis is that logicism has of late been too easily dismissed. Though several critical aspects of Frege's logicism must be altered in light of recent results, the central Fregean thesis is still an important and promising view about the nature of arithmetic and arithmetical knowledge
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