Moral Scepticism and Inductive Scepticism
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 90:65 - 82 (1990)
Abstract
Viewing moral scepticism as the rejection of objective desirabilities, inductive scepticism may be seen as the rejection of objective believabilities. Moral scepticism leads naturally to amoralism rather than subjectivism, and inductive scepticism undermines not our practices of induction but only a view about justification. The two scepticisms together amount to the adoption of a defensibly narrow, formal view of reasonDOI
10.1093/aristotelian/90.1.65
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Citations of this work
Chance, credence, and the principal principle.Robert Black - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (3):371-385.
Chance, credence, and the principle.Robert Black - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (3):371-385.
The Local Nature of Modern Moral Skepticism.Diego E. Machuca - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):315–324.
Moral Error Theory and the Problem of Evil.Chris Daly - 2009 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1 (2):89 - 105.
