Normativity à la mode

The Journal of Ethics 5 (2):139-153 (2001)
Abstract
This paper sets out to raise questions about the metaphor of the spaceof reasons. It argues that a proper appreciation of Wittgensteinundermines the metaphysical or dualistic way of taking the metaphor thatis supposed to prevent the naturalization of reason.
Keywords McDowell  naturalism  normativity  reason  Sellars  Wittgenstein
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1011904222903
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