On Hannah Arendt’s Aestheticism

Res Philosophica 101 (3):479-504 (2024)
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Abstract

Hannah Arendt’s politics is aesthetic rather than practical, motivated by enjoyment rather than well-being, and so it should be rejected. I begin with an account of aestheticism as the doctrine according to which seemingly non-aesthetic things are actually aesthetic, parts of a whole dimension of reality that we might simply call “the aesthetic.” We access it by taking a disinterested attitude, one that affirms things for their own sakes, and there are four ways of doing this: disinterested appreciating (e.g., of beautiful art), fun playing, fantasizing, and putting on shows or spectacles. While Arendt’s politics takes a classical republican form that is like a competitive game, an analysis of her conceptions of acting and judging reveals that the modes of disinterested showing and appreciating are also present. Her philosophy has another motivation, however, alongside enjoying the aesthetic: the need to escape the reality of evil.

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Charles Blattberg
Université de Montréal

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References found in this work

8. Judging - the Actor and the Spectator.Richard J. Bernstein - 1986 - In Philosophical profiles: essays in a pragmatic mode. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Polity Press in association with B. Blackwell, Oxford. pp. 221-237.
The judgment of Arendt.George Kateb - 1999 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 53 (208):133-154.
Present Age.Soren Kierkegaard - 1962 - Harper Collins.

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