Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):805-827 (2019)

Authors
Reid Blackman
University of Texas at Austin (PhD)
Abstract
Internalism about normative reasons is the view that an agent’s normative reasons depend on her motivational constitution. On the assumption that there are reasons for emotion I argue that externalism about reasons for emotion entails that all rational agents have reasons to be morally motivated and internalism about reasons for emotion is implausible. If the arguments are sound we can conclude that all rational agents have reasons to be morally motivated. Resisting this conclusion requires either justifying internalism about reasons for emotion in a way hitherto unarticulated or giving up on reasons for emotion altogether.
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.2018.1435611
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Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford University Press.

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