Subject sensitive invariantism: In memoriam

Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):318–325 (2008)
Abstract
Subject sensitive invariantism is the view that whether a subject knows depends on what is at stake for that subject: the truth-value of a knowledge-attribution is sensitive to the subject's practical interests. I argue that subject sensitive invariantism cannot accept a very plausible principle for memory to transmit knowledge. I argue, furthermore, that semantic contextualism and contrastivism can accept this plausible principle for memory to transmit knowledge. I conclude that semantic contextualism and contrastivism are in a dialectical position better than subject sensitive invariantism is.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.532.x
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References found in this work BETA
Solving the Skeptical Problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
From Contextualism to Contrastivism.Jonathan Schaffer - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):73-104.

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Citations of this work BETA
Shifty Talk: Knowledge and Causation.Jessica Brown - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):183-199.
Contrastivism in Epistemology.Martijn Blaauw - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):227 – 234.
Epistemic Value, Achievements, and Questions.Martijn Blaauw - 2008 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):43-57.
II—Martijn Blaauw: Epistemic Value, Achievements, and Questions.Martijn Blaauw - 2008 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):43-57.

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