Solving the problem of easy knowledge

Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):597-617 (2008)
Abstract
Stewart Cohen argues that several epistemological theories fall victim to the problem of easy knowledge: they allow us to know far too easily that certain sceptical hypotheses are false and that how things seem is a reliable indicator of how they are. This problem is a result of the theories' interaction with an epistemic closure principle. Cohen suggests that the theories should be modified. I argue that attempts to solve the problem should focus on closure instead; a new and plausible epistemic closure principle can solve the problem of easy knowledge. My solution offers a uniform and more successful response to different versions of the problem of easy knowledge
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.554.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 26,178
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons.Stewart Cohen - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):57-89.
What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.
Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge.Stewart Cohen - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.
How to Be a Fallibilist.Stewart Cohen - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.
Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign.Michael Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):709–727.

View all 11 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Sensitivity, Safety, and Closure.Sven Bernecker - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (4):367-381.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

208 ( #18,360 of 2,153,578 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

7 ( #105,174 of 2,153,578 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums