Oxford University Press (1999)
This volume is designed to set out some of the central issues in the theory of truth. It draws together, for the first time, the debates between philosophers who favor 'robust' or 'substantive' theories of truth, and those other, 'deflationist' or minimalists, who deny that such theories can be given. The editors provide a substantial introduction, in which they look at how the debates relate to further issues, such as the Liar paradox and formal truth theories.
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|Call number||BC171.T76 1999|
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Citations of this work BETA
The False Modesty of the Identity Theory of Truth.Pascal Engel - 2001 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (4):441 – 458.
What Should Deflationism Be When It Grows Up?Claire Horisk - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 125 (3):371-397.
Truth Via Anaphorically Unrestricted Quantifiers.Jody Azzouni - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (4):329-354.
Quine's Ladder: Two and a Half Pages From the Philosophy of Logic.Marian David - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):274-312.
On Wright's Argument Against Deflationism.Alexander Miller - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):527-531.
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