Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):201-213 (2009)

Authors
Simon Blackburn
Cambridge University
Abstract
In this journal Andy Egan argued that, contrary to what I have claimed, quasi-realism is committed to a damaging asymmetry between the way a subject regards himself and the way he regards others. In particular, a subject must believe it to be a priori that if something is one of his stable or fundamental beliefs, then it is true. Whereas he will not hold that this is a priori true of other people. In this paper I rebut Egan's argument, and give further consideration to the correct way to think about our own fallibility
Keywords Realism   Metaethics   Ethics
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DOI 10.1080/00048400802362182
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References found in this work BETA

Zettel.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1967 - Blackwell.
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Darwin and Moral Realism: Survival of the Iffiest.Knut Olav Skarsaune - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):229-243.
Fallibility for Expressivists.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):763-777.
Truthmaking, Metaethics, and Creeping Minimalism.Jamin Asay - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):213-232.
Making Quasi-Realists Admit of Fundamental Moral Fallibility.Garrett Lam - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):294-303.
Normative certitude for expressivists.Michael Ridge - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3325-3347.

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