Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 54 (6):614 - 632 (2011)
Abstract This article examines the little-explored remarks on verification in Wittgenstein's notebooks during the period between 1930 and 1932. In these remarks, Wittgenstein connects a verificationist theory of meaning with the notion of logical multiplicity, understood as a space of possibilities: a proposition is verified by a fact if and only if the proposition and the fact have the same logical multiplicity. But while in his early philosophy logical multiplicities were analysed as an outcome of the formal properties of simple objects and simple signs, Wittgenstein in the early 1930s connects the notion of logical multiplicity with the notion of ways of seeing. I will argue that the relevant ways of seeing are closely similar to seeing-as or aspect seeing. According to Wittgenstein's view in the early 1930s, logical multiplicities are part of our perceptual experience of propositions and facts. In this sense, the verification relation depends on how we experience propositions and facts as being surrounded by a logical space of possibilities. Strikingly, Wittgenstein's way of thinking about the verification relation offers solutions to a set of seemingly intractable problems connected with the versions of verificationism developed by members of the Vienna Circle
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Wittgenstein on the Arbitrariness of Grammar.Michael N. Forster - 2004 - Princeton University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Wittgenstein on Colours and Logical Multiplicities, 1930–1932.Andreas Blank - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (2):311.
Wittgenstein on Expectation, Action, and Internal Relations, 1930-1932.Andreas Blank - 2007 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):270 – 287.
How Old Are These Bones? Putnam, Wittgenstein and Verification: Cora Diamond.Cora Diamond - 1999 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):99–134.
Going Around the Vienna Circle: Wittgenstein and Verification.Michael Hymers - 2005 - Philosophical Investigations 28 (3):205–234.
The Early Wittgenstein on Logical Assertion.Ian Proops - 1997 - Philosophical Topics 25 (2):121-144.
The Tractatus on Logical Consequence.José L. Zalabardo - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):425-442.
The Power and the Limits of Wittgenstein's N Operator.James McGray - 2006 - History and Philosophy of Logic 27 (2):143-169.
Wittgenstein's Tractatus Project as Philosophy of Information.R. A. Young - 2004 - Minds and Machines 14 (1):119-132.
Elementary Prepositions, Independence, and Pictures.Rod Bertolet - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:53-61.
Logical Atomism in Russell and Wittgenstein.Ian Proops - 2011 - In Marie McGinn & Oskari Kuusela (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein. Oxford University Press.
Assertion and Affirmation in the Early Wittgenstein.Giorgio Lando - 2011 - Wittgenstein-Studien 2 (1):21-47.
Wittgenstein's Logical Atomism.Ian Proops - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (65):374-376.
The Undiscovered Wittgenstein: The Twentieth Century's Most Misunderstood Philosopher.John W. Cook - 2004 - Humanity Books.
Added to index2011-11-15
Total downloads33 ( #156,471 of 2,172,771 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #117,216 of 2,172,771 )
How can I increase my downloads?