When propriety is improper

Philosophical Studies 176 (2):367-386 (2019)

Abstract

We argue that philosophers ought to distinguish epistemic decision theory and epistemology, in just the way ordinary decision theory is distinguished from ethics. Once one does this, the internalist arguments that motivate much of epistemic decision theory make sense, given specific interpretations of the formalism. Making this distinction also causes trouble for the principle called Propriety, which says, roughly, that the only acceptable epistemic utility functions make probabilistically coherent credence functions immodest. We cast doubt on this requirement, but then argue that epistemic decision theorists should never have wanted such a strong principle in any case.

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Author's Profile

Daniel Drucker
University of Texas at Austin

References found in this work

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
Morals by Agreement.David P. Gauthier - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.

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Citations of this work

Updating for Externalists.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2021 - Noûs 55 (3):487-516.
Accuracy, Verisimilitude, and Scoring Rules.Jeffrey Dunn - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):151-166.

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