In R. L. Gregory (ed.), R. Gregory Oxford Companion to the Mind, Second Edition 2004. Oxford University Press (2004)
There are two broad classes of empirical theories of consciousness, which I will call the biological and the functional. The biological approach is based on empirical correlations between experience and the brain. For example, there is a great deal of evidence that the neural correlate of visual experience is activity in a set of occipetotemporal pathways, with special emphasis on the infero-temporal cortex. The functionalist approach is a successor of behaviorism, the view that mentality can be seen as tendencies to emit certain behavioral outputs given certain sensory inputs. The trouble with behaviorism is that it did not allow that mental states were causes and effects, but functionalists do allow this. They characterize consciousness in terms of its causal role: the causal influence on it from inputs and other mental states, and its causal efficacy with respect to other mental states and behavior. The central idea of functionalism is a proposal about the concept of consciousness, but scientific functionalists have filled the view in with empirical details—the idea is that a representation is conscious if it is broadcast in a global neuronal workspace. The functional approach says consciousness is a role, whereas the biological approach says consciousness is a realizer of that role. For example, one could take solubility to be a role—dissolving in certain circumstances—or, as with the biological view of consciousness, the physico-chemical configuration that has that role. The.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 1997, 2004
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 29,861
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Greek Zombies.Jan Sleutels - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (2):177-197.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
The Functional Role of Consciousness: A Phenomenological Approach.Uriah Kriegel - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (2):171-93.
Nietzsche, Consciousness, and Human Agency.Tsarina Doyle - 2011 - Idealistic Studies 41 (1-2):11-30.
Epistemic Consciousness.Neil Manson - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (3):425-441.
Is Consciousness Epiphenomenal? Comment on Susan Pockett.Gilberto Gomes - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (12):77-79.
Two Concepts of Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
Identifying Mental States: A Celebrated Hypothesis Refuted.Irwin Goldstein - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):46-62.
Epistemic Consciousness.C. N. - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (3):425-441.
A Rediscovery of Consciousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1994 - Consciousness and Cognition 3 (2):223-245.
Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness?Alva Noë & Evan Thompson - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):3-28.
The Search for Neural Correlates of Consciousness.Jakob Hohwy - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (3):461–474.
Why the Neural Correlates of Consciousness Cannot Be Found.Bernard Molyneux - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (9-10):168-188.
Added to PP index

Total downloads
1,584 ( #378 of 2,210,666 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #82,527 of 2,210,666 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature