Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):289-317 (2008)

Authors
Ned Block
New York University
Abstract
This article concerns the interplay between two issues that involve both philosophy and neuroscience: whether the content of phenomenal consciousness is 'rich' or 'sparse', whether phenomenal consciousness goes beyond cognitive access, and how it would be possible for there to be evidence one way or the other.
Keywords Consciousness   Cognitive Science   Neuroscience   Mind
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2008.00247.x
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References found in this work BETA

Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce.Charles S. Peirce - 1931 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Consciousness Explained.William G. Lycan - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (3):424.

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Citations of this work BETA

Perceptual Consciousness Overflows Cognitive Access.Ned Block - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (12):567-575.

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