Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):89-100 (2013)
Epistemic contextualism is widely believed to be incompatible with the recently popular view that knowledge is the norm of assertion, practical reasoning, or belief. I argue in this article that the problems arising for contextualism from the mentioned normative views are only apparent and can be resolved by acknowledging the fairly widespread phenomenon of non-obvious context-sensitivity (recently embraced by even some of contextualism's most ardent former critics). Building on recent insights about non-obvious context-sensitivity, the article outlines an independently attractive contextualist account of the mentioned epistemic norms and provides a solution to the puzzles they give rise to in a contextualist framework
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Why Contextualists Cannot Know They Are Right: Self-Refuting Implications of Contextualism. [REVIEW]Elke Brendel - 2005 - Acta Analytica 20 (2):38-55.
Epistemic Contextualism: A Normative Approach.Robin McKenna - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):101-123.
Contextualist Approaches to Epistemology: Problems and Prospects.Elke Brendel & Christoph Jäger - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):143 - 172.
Contextualism and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion.Christoph Jäger - 2012 - Analysis 72 (3):491-498.
Contextualism, Closure, and the Knowledge Account of Assertion.Christopher Buford - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:111-121.
Presuppositional Epistemic Contextualism and the Problem of Known Presuppositions.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press. pp. 104-119.
In Defence of a Minimal Conception of Epistemic Contextualism: A Reply to M. D. Ashfield's Response. [REVIEW]Wolfgang Freitag - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (1):127-137.
Added to index2012-04-05
Total downloads293 ( #9,470 of 2,132,893 )
Recent downloads (6 months)29 ( #11,492 of 2,132,893 )
How can I increase my downloads?
There are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.