Ideals and monisms: recent criticisms of the Strong Programme in the sociology of knowledge

Abstract
I offer a reply to criticisms of the Strong Programme presented by Stephen Kemp who develops some new lines of argument that focus on the ‘monism’ of the programme. He says the programme should be rejected for three reasons. First, because it embodies ‘weak idealism’, that is, its supporters effectively sever the link between language and the world. Second, it challenges the reasons that scientists offer in explanation of their own beliefs. Third, it destroys the distinction between successful and unsuccessful instrumental action. Kemp is careful to produce quotations from the supporters of the programme as evidence to support his case. All three points deserve and are given a detailed response and the interpretation of the quoted material plays a significant role in the discussion. My hope is that careful exegesis will offset the numerous misinterpretations that are current in the philosophical literature. Particular attention is paid to what is said about the normative standards involved in the application of empirical concepts. The operation of these standards in the face of the negotiability of all concepts is explored and misapprehensions on the topic are corrected. The work of Wittgenstein, Popper, Kuhn and Hesse is used to illustrate these themes.Keywords: Strong Programme; Social constructionism; Idealism; Monism; Finitism; Relativism
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1016/j.shpsa.2006.12.003
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,157
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume - 1739/2000 - Oxford University Press.
The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory.Pierre Maurice Marie Duhem - 1954 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Anti-Latour.D. Bloor - 1999 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 30 (1):81-112.
L'histoire des Sciences Est-Elle Possible.S. Shapin - 1982 - History of Science 20:157-211.
Durkheim and Mauss Revisited: Classification and the Sociology of Knowledge.David Bloor - 1982 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 13 (4):267--97.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Relativism About Reasons.Nick Tosh - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (4):465-482.
Concepts, Anomalies and Reality: A Response to Bloor and Fehér.Stephen Kemp - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (1):241-253.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Relativism and the Sociology of Mathematics: Remarks on Bloor, Flew, and Frege.Timm Triplett - 1986 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 29 (1-4):439-450.
A Second Look at David Bloor's: Knowledge and Social Imagery.Peter Slezak - 1994 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 24 (3):336-361.
Toward a Monistic Theory of Science: The `Strong Programme' Reconsidered.Stephen Kemp - 2003 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (3):311-338.
Levels of Reflexivity: Unnoted Differences Within the "Strong Programme" in the Sociology of Knowledge.Edward Manier - 1980 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:197-207.
A Critique of Relativism in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge.Sun Si - 2007 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 2 (1):115-130.
The Social Construction of Social Constructionism.Peter Slezak - 1994 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):139 – 157.
Realism, Reliabilism, and the 'Strong Programme' in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge.Jeff Kochan - 2008 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (1):21 – 38.
Conventionalism, Scientific Discovery and the Sociology of Knowledge.Angelo M. Petroni - 1993 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (3):225 – 240.
Can Relativism Be Reconciled with Realism and Causalism?Barbara Tuchańska - 1990 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (3):285-294.
The Underdetermination of Theory by Data and the "Strong Programme" in the Sociology of Knowledge.Samir Okasha - 2000 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (3):283 – 297.
The Strong Programme.Finn Collin - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 43:43-49.
Reasons, Causes, and the 'Strong Programme' in the Sociology of Knowledge.Warren Schmaus - 1985 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 15 (2):189-196.
Bloor's Bluff: Behaviourism and the Strong Programme.Peter Slezak - 1991 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5 (3):241 – 256.
Rethinking the “Strong Programme” in the Sociology of Knowledge.Adrian Haddock - 2004 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 35 (1):19-40.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2010-09-02

Total downloads

47 ( #111,389 of 2,171,932 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #326,556 of 2,171,932 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums