Abstract

Epicuras holds that death should not be feared, as it cannot be experienced. This thesis defends that view. ;If all sensation ceases when the body dies, one's own non-existence cannot possibly be experienced. If, as is argued, good and bad cannot be inherent qualities, death cannot be inherently bad. It follows that one need not fear one's own non-existence. ;Acceptance of this view may not affect our fear of death, but it implies that if we encounter a person who has lost the fear of death, or who fears a painful dying more than being dead, we cannot show that the person is wrong and that he ought to fear his imminent annihilation. ;It is argued that our fear of death is caused by our inability to conceive our own non-existence. When we try to imagine our own death we do not see death as a state of non-existence, but as a different kind of existence. This forces us to see death as part of our future, when death is in fact outside the scope of our future; our future ends when we die. As a result, we assign a value to our own future non-existence, even if we accept that non-existence as a state is valueless. ;Not only is non-existence valueless, mere existence is shown to be valueless as well. If a particular life is a good life, it is because the particular person's existence is filled with good events, not because the particular person exists at all. "Sanctity of Life" is shown to be an empty concept. ;Although a person's non-existence cannot be a harm to him, it can still be shown that the killing of a person can be wrong. If a person is killed against his wishes it will adversely affect other people, as they will feel more vulnerable and/or will suffer sympathetic pain at witnessing the death. However, if all people were to go out of existence instantaneously, no harm would result, as there would be no one left to experience harm