If perception is probabilistic, why doesn't it seem probabilistic?

Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 373 (1755) (2018)
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The success of the Bayesian approach to perception suggests probabilistic perceptual representations. But if perceptual representation is probabilistic, why doesn't normal conscious perception reflect the full probability distributions that the probabilistic point of view endorses? For example, neurons in MT/V5 that respond to the direction of motion are broadly tuned: a patch of cortex that is tuned to vertical motion also responds to horizontal motion, but when we see vertical motion, foveally, in good conditions, it does not look at all horizontal. This article argues that the best Bayesian approach to this problem does not require probabilistic representation.



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Ned Block
New York University

Citations of this work

Third-Personal Evidence for Perceptual Confidence.John Morrison - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Perception and probability.Alex Byrne - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:1-21.
Representation in Cognitive Science: Replies.Nicholas Shea - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (3):402-412.

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