If perception is probabilistic, why doesn't it seem probabilistic?
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 373 (1755) (2018)
Abstract
The success of the Bayesian approach to perception suggests probabilistic perceptual representations. But if perceptual representation is probabilistic, why doesn't normal conscious perception reflect the full probability distributions that the probabilistic point of view endorses? For example, neurons in MT/V5 that respond to the direction of motion are broadly tuned: a patch of cortex that is tuned to vertical motion also responds to horizontal motion, but when we see vertical motion, foveally, in good conditions, it does not look at all horizontal. This article argues that the best Bayesian approach to this problem does not require probabilistic representation.Author's Profile
My notes
Similar books and articles
Probabilistic Grammars and Languages.András Kornai - 2011 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 20 (3):317-328.
A Probabilistic Model of Melody Perception.David Temperley - 2008 - Cognitive Science 32 (2):418-444.
Does Perceptual Consciousness Overflow Cognitive Access? The Challenge from Probabilistic, Hierarchical Processes.Steven Gross & Jonathan Flombaum - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (3):358-391.
The probabilistic import of illatives.George Bowles & Thomas E. Gilbert - 1993 - Argumentation 7 (3):247-262.
Probabilistic Alternatives to Bayesianism: The Case of Explanationism.Igor Douven & Jonah N. Schupbach - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
A Probabilistic Analysis of Causation.Luke Glynn - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):343-392.
All Probabilistic Methods Assume a Subjective Definition of Probability.Mark Crovelli - 2012 - Libertarian Papers 4.
Probabilistic Logic and Probabilistic Networks. Haenni, R., Romeijn, J.-W., Wheeler, G. & Williamson, J. - unknown
Triviality Results For Probabilistic Modals.Goldstein Simon - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):188-222.
A Nontemporal Probabilistic Approach to Special and General Relativity.Frank Blume - 2006 - Foundations of Physics 36 (9):1404-1440.
Bayes and the first person: consciousness of thoughts, inner speech and probabilistic inference.Franz Knappik - 2017 - Synthese:1-28.
Logical relations in a statistical problem.Jon Williamson, Jan-Willem Romeijn, Rolf Haenni & Gregory Wheeler - 2008 - In Benedikt Lowe, Jan-Willem Romeijn & Eric Pacuit (eds.), Foundations of the Formal Sciences Vi: Probabilistic Reasoning and Reasoning With Probabilities. Studies in Logic. College Publications.
Analytics
Added to PP
2018-05-23
Downloads
345 (#34,065)
6 months
26 (#46,548)
2018-05-23
Downloads
345 (#34,065)
6 months
26 (#46,548)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
How can perceptual experiences explain uncertainty?Susanna Siegel - 2020 - Mind and Language 37 (2):134-158.
Third-Personal Evidence for Perceptual Confidence.John Morrison - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
The Perception-Cognition Border: A Case for Architectural Division.E. J. Green - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (3):323-393.
Representation in Cognitive Science: Replies.Nicholas Shea - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (3):402-412.
References found in this work
Seeing‐As in the Light of Vision Science.Ned Block - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):560-572.
Perceptual consciousness overflows cognitive access.Ned Block - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (12):567-575.
Conscious, preconscious, and subliminal processing: A testable taxonomy.Stanislas Dehaene, Jean-Pierre Changeux, Lionel Naccache, Jérôme Sackur & Claire Sergent - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (5):204-211.
Consciousness cannot be separated from function.Michael A. Cohen & Daniel C. Dennett - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (8):358--364.
Predictive coding explains binocular rivalry: an epistemological review.Jakob Hohwy, Andreas Roepstorff & Karl Friston - 2008 - Cognition 108 (3):687-701.