In D. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. pp. 206-219 (2002)
Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses". Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state
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