Analysis 67 (3):214-219 (2007)

Authors
Michael Blome-Tillmann
McGill University
Abstract
The paper gives an a priori argument for the view that knowledge is unanalysable. To establish this conclusion I argue that warrant, i.e. the property, whatever precisely it is, which makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief, entails both truth and belief and thus does not exist as a property distinct from knowledge: all and only knowledge can turn a true belief into knowledge. The paper concludes that the project of trying to find a condition distinct from knowledge that is necessary and together with truth and belief sufficient for knowledge must be doomed to failure.
Keywords knowledge  warrant  conceptual analysis
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-8284.2007.00676.x
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
The Inescapability of Gettier Problems.Linda Zagzebski - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):65-73.
An Analysis of Factual Knowledge.Peter Unger - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (6):157-170.

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Citations of this work BETA

Warrant Does Entail Truth.Andrew Moon - 2012 - Synthese 184 (3):287-297.

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