Non-Cognitivism and the Grammar of Morality

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):279-309 (2009)
Abstract
This paper investigates the linguistic basis for moral non-cognitivism, the view that sentences containing moral predicates do not have truth conditions. It offers a new argument against this view by pointing out that the view is incompatible with our best empirical theories about the grammatical encoding of illocutionary force potentials. Given that my arguments are based on very general assumptions about the relations between the grammar of natural languages and a sentence's illocutionary function, my arguments are broader in scope than the familiar semantic objections to non-cognitivism relating to the so-called Frege-Geach problem: even if a solution to the Frege-Geach problem has been found, my arguments still stand
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00268.x
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References found in this work BETA
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.
Spreading the Word.Simon Blackburn - 1984 - Clarendon Press.

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Deferentialism.Chris Daly & David Liggins - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (3):321-337.

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