Fundamental Hope and Practical Identity

Philosophical Papers 46 (3):345–371 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article considers the question ‘What makes hope rational?’ We take Adrienne Martin’s recent incorporation analysis of hope as representative of a tradition that views the rationality of hope as a matter of instrumental reasons. Against this tradition, we argue that an important subset of hope, ‘fundamental hope’, is not governed by instrumental rationality. Rather, people have reason to endorse or reject such hope in virtue of the contribution of the relevant attitudes to the integrity of their practical identity, which makes the relevant hope not instrumentally but intrinsically valuable. This argument also allows for a new analysis of the reasons people have to abandon hope and for a better understanding of non-fundamental, ‘prosaic’ hopes.

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-12-20

Downloads
389 (#29,406)

6 months
61 (#20,176)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Citations of this work

Hope: Conceptual and Normative Issues.Catherine Rioux - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (3).
Epistemological Aspects of Hope.Matthew A. Benton - 2019 - In Claudia Blöser & Titus Stahl (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Hope. London: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 135-151.
Hope.Claudia Bloeser & Titus Stahl - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Emotion.Charlie Kurth - 2022 - Routledge.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Philosophy 63 (243):119-122.
How We Hope: A Moral Psychology.Adrienne M. Martin - 2014 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.

View all 21 references / Add more references