Fundamental Hope and Practical Identity
Philosophical Papers 46 (3):345–371 (2017)
Abstract
This article considers the question ‘What makes hope rational?’ We take Adrienne Martin’s recent incorporation analysis of hope as representative of a tradition that views the rationality of hope as a matter of instrumental reasons. Against this tradition, we argue that an important subset of hope, ‘fundamental hope’, is not governed by instrumental rationality. Rather, people have reason to endorse or reject such hope in virtue of the contribution of the relevant attitudes to the integrity of their practical identity, which makes the relevant hope not instrumentally but intrinsically valuable. This argument also allows for a new analysis of the reasons people have to abandon hope and for a better understanding of non-fundamental, ‘prosaic’ hopes.Author Profiles
DOI
10.1080/05568641.2017.1400918
My notes
Similar books and articles
What May I Hope? Why It Can Be Rational to Rely on One’s Hope.Döring Sabine - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (3):117--129.
Why Hope is not a Moral Virtue: Aquinas's Insight.Christopher A. Bobier - 2018 - Ratio 31 (2):214-232.
Responses from Palliative Care: Hope Is Like Water.Chris Feudtner - 2014 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 57 (4):555-557.
Analytics
Added to PP
2017-12-20
Downloads
389 (#29,406)
6 months
61 (#20,176)
2017-12-20
Downloads
389 (#29,406)
6 months
61 (#20,176)
Historical graph of downloads
Author Profiles
Citations of this work
Belief, Faith, and Hope: On the Rationality of Long-Term Commitment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Mind 130 (517):35–57.
Epistemological Aspects of Hope.Matthew A. Benton - 2019 - In Claudia Blöser & Titus Stahl (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Hope. London: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 135-151.