Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)

Kyle H. Blumberg
Australian Catholic University
John Hawthorne
Australian Catholic University
The analysis of desire ascriptions has been a central topic of research for philosophers of language and mind. This work has mostly focused on providing a theory of want reports, i.e. sentences of the form 'S wants p'. In this paper, we turn attention from want reports to a closely related, but relatively understudied construction, namely hope reports, i.e. sentences of the form 'S hopes p'. We present two contrasts involving hope reports, and show that existing approaches to desire fail to explain these contrasts. We then develop a novel account that combines some of the central insights in the literature. We argue that our theory provides us with an elegant account of our contrasts, and yields a promising analysis of hoping.
Keywords Logic of desire  Attitude ascriptions  Alternative sensitivity  Decision Theory
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References found in this work BETA

Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
Risk and Rationality.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
Two Ways to Want?Ethan Jerzak - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (2):65-98.

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Wanting What's Not Best.Kyle H. Blumberg & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.

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