Journal of Philosophy 119 (1):5-32 (2022)

Kyle H. Blumberg
Australian Catholic University
John Hawthorne
Australian Catholic University
The analysis of desire ascriptions has been a central topic of research for philosophers of language and mind. This work has mostly focused on providing a theory of want reports, that is, sentences of the form ‘S wants p’. In this paper, we turn from want reports to a closely related but relatively understudied construction, namely hope reports, that is, sentences of the form ‘S hopes p’. We present two contrasts involving hope reports and show that existing approaches to desire fail to explain these contrasts. We then develop a novel account that combines some of the central insights in the literature. We argue that our theory provides an elegant account of our contrasts and yields a promising analysis of hoping.
Keywords Logic of desire  Attitude ascriptions  Alternative sensitivity  Decision Theory
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.5840/jphil202211911
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Counterfactuals.David Kellogg Lewis - 1973 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Blackwell.
Risk and Rationality.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1974 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.

View all 40 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Externalist’s Demon.Clayton Littlejohn - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):399-434.
Wanting What’s Not Best.Kyle Blumberg & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1275-1296.
On Preferring.Kyle Blumberg - forthcoming - Linguistics and Philosophy:1-30.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
299 ( #36,043 of 2,518,142 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
82 ( #9,197 of 2,518,142 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes