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Authors
Kyle H. Blumberg
Australian Catholic University
Abstract
The Ideal Worlds Account of Desire says that S wants p just in case all of S's most highly preferred doxastic possibilities make p true. The account predicts that a desire report 'S wants p' should be true so long as there is some doxastic p-possibility that is most preferred (by S). But we present a novel argument showing that this prediction is incorrect. More positively, we take our examples to support alternative analyses of desire, and close by briefly considering what our cases suggest about the logic of desire.
Keywords theories of desire  logic of desire  desire ascriptions
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References found in this work BETA

Inquiry.Robert Stalnaker - 1984 - Cambridge University Press.
Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes.Willard van Orman Quine - 1956 - Journal of Philosophy 53 (5):177-187.
What 'Must' and 'Can' Must and Can Mean.Angelika Kratzer - 1977 - Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (3):337--355.
A New Hope.Kyle H. Blumberg & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.

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Citations of this work BETA

A New Hope.Kyle H. Blumberg & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
Wanting What’s Not Best.Kyle Blumberg & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-22.

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