Philosophers' Imprint (forthcoming)

Kyle H. Blumberg
Australian Catholic University
John Hawthorne
Australian Catholic University
In this paper, we present two puzzles involving desire reports concerning series of events. What does a person want to happen in the first event---is it the event with the highest expected return, or the event that is the initial part of the best series? We show that existing approaches fail to resolve the puzzles around this question and develop a novel account of our own. Our semantics is built around three ideas. First, we propose that desire ascriptions are evaluated relative to a contextually supplied set of propositions, or alternatives. The semantic value of an ascription `S wants p' is determined by S's preference ordering over these alternatives. Second, we propose that desire reports carry a requirement to the e ect that the prejacent of the ascription must be suitably related to the background set of alternatives. Finally, we suggest that desire reports carry a dominance condition concerning the subject's ranking of the alternatives.
Keywords desire  attitude reports  context sensitivity  alternative sensitivity  logic of desire
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References found in this work BETA

Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.
Risk and Rationality.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Wanting What’s Not Best.Kyle Blumberg & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1275-1296.

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