Journal of Semantics 36 (3):377-406 (2019)

Authors
Ben Holguín
Princeton University
Kyle H. Blumberg
Australian Catholic University
Abstract
This paper presents a puzzle involving embedded attitude reports. We resolve the puzzle by arguing that attitude verbs take restricted readings: in some environments the denotation of attitude verbs can be restricted by a given proposition. For example, when these verbs are embedded in the consequent of a conditional, they can be restricted by the proposition expressed by the conditional’s antecedent. We formulate and motivate two conditions on the availability of verb restrictions: a constraint that ties the content of restrictions to the “dynamic effects” of sentential connectives and a constraint that limits the availability of restriction effects to present tense verbs with first-person subjects. However, we also present some cases that make trouble for these conditions, and outline some possible ways of modifying the view to account for the recalcitrant data. We conclude with a brief discussion of some of the connections between our semantics for attitude verbs and issues concerning epistemic modals and theories of knowledge.
Keywords attitude verbs  restriction  dynamic effects  knowledge  modals
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DOI 10.1093/jos/ffz004
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Attitudes We Can Have.Daniel Drucker - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):591-642.
Revisionist Reporting.Kyle Blumberg & Harvey Lederman - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):755-783.
Probabilistic Antecedents and Conditional Attitudes.Benjamin Lennertz - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):62-79.

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